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Transformation of the Family Farm under Rising Land
Pressure: A Theoretical Essay
June 2, 2014
Abstract
If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions
of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about
the mode of evolution of the family farms possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand
evidence from West Africa, this paper argues that these units undergo a similar process
of individualization governed by the same forces as property rights in land. It provides a
simple theoretical account of the coexistence of different forms of family when farms are
heterogenous in land endowments and technology is stagnant. In particular, it throws
light on the factors determining the coexistence of collective fields and individual plots
inside the family farm, and on those driving the possible splitting of the family. The
paper also offers analytical insights into the sequence following which such forms succeed
each other.
Keywords: Land, Family, Agriculture, Africa
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1 Introduction
We have today a relatively good grasp of why and how land tenure rules evolve at the commu-
nity level as long as the transformation of these rules is not disturbed by external influences
or power games. When this condition is satisfied, a shift from corporate ownership of land
(possibly including the granting of long-term use rights to individual households) to individ-
ualized forms of tenure ranging from less to more complete private property rights tends to
occur when the value of land increases because of population pressure or increased market
integration. The key mechanism is that a better internalization of externalities and stronger
incentives to conserve and improve land are thereby provided (Boserup, 1965; Demsetz, 1967;
Ault and Rutman, 1979; Feder and Feeny, 1981; Feder and Noronha, 1987; Baland and Plat-
teau, 1998; Platteau, 1996 and 2000: Chaps. 3-4). When political forces are at play that
enable a privileged class to tamper with the endogenous evolution process, such as happens,
for example, when its members collude to prevent competition from benefitting small farmers
and agricultural workers, the path of transition to more individualized land rights may be
blocked and various situations can arise (Domar, 1970; Smith, 1959; Breman, 1974; Cohen
and Weitzman, 1975; de Janvry, 1981; Bhaduri, 1973; Binswanger, Deininger and Feder,
1995; Brenner, 1996; Conning and Robinson, 2007; Conning and Kevane, 2007).
In contrast, the organizational features of the landholding unit and its variations across
space and over time are still poorly understood. Rather paradoxically, this is especially true
of family farm structures that have been relatively free of outside interferences and politico-
legal constraints. What we argue in this paper is that the same force, growing land scarcity,
that drives the individualization of land tenure also drives the individualization of the family
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owning and managing the land provided that the transformation process is unimpeded by
external factors. Therefore, when private rights in land are well-established and the land
frontier is closed, as pressure on land continues to rise, the individualization process goes on,
yet now more at the level of the farm units than at the level of the community where rules
governing land allocation and tenure rights are decided. In the following we use the term
“family farm” to designate an agricultural household headed by a patriarch who manages
“collective fields” where members are required to work.
As epitomized by the past experience of Russia or the recent-day experience of Mali (West
Africa), individualization at the family farm level occurs when either of the two following
circumstances arise: (i) the patriarch decides to grant individual plots to members of the
household, and these are entitled to keep for themselves the entire proceeds of such plots
while they are simultaneously required to work on the collective fields; (ii) the patriarch
agrees to “split” the stem household, implying that some members leave with a portion of the
land equivalent to a pre-mortem inheritance, in order to form separate, autonomous branch
households. While the first scenario involves the transformation of a purely collective farm
into a “mixed” farm, the second scenario implies that part of the family land is inherited
pre-mortem. Insofar as property rights in land become vested in smaller family units, the
second scenario appears to correspond to a more advanced form of individualization than
what is obtained when large family farms dominate the landscape. None the less, the order
in which these two forms, the mixed farm and the branch household farm, should succeed
each other as land pressure rises is far from evident.
In this paper we provide a theoretical framework to understand the shift from collective
to mixed family farms on the one hand and the split of family farms on the other. So far,
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economists have proposed few theories of the evolution of the family farm, and the available
theories aim at explaining only one of the type of individualization described above.
Fafchamps (2001) offers an example of the former by developing a theoretical model to
explain the decision of the household head to allocate individual plots to family members. At
the core of his model is a problem of commitment. Because the head is unwilling or unable
to commit to reward their work on the family field after the harvest, family members are
tempted to relax their labour efforts or to divert them to other income-earning activities. To
solve this commitment failure problem, the head decides to reward his wife and dependents
for their labour on the collective field by giving them individual plots of land and the right
to freely dispose of the resulting produce. It is evident that the commitment problem only
exists if the short-term gain of deviating from cooperation (which means here reneging on the
promise to reward the workers for their effort on the collective field) exceeds the long-term flow
of benefits ensuing from a smooth relationship between the household head and the working
members. As Fafchamps himself recognizes this condition is restrictive, since the game played
within the family is by definition of a long (and indeterminate) duration, and the discount
rate of future benefits typically low (future cooperation among close relatives matters a lot).
Moreover, even assuming that Fafchamps’ hypothesis is valid, it remains unclear why there
should be a tendency over time for collective farms to transform themselves into mixed farms.
Finally, Fafchamps does not consider a potential break-up of the household accompanied by
a (partial or complete) division of the landholding.
Other authors have tried to explain the coexistence of collective fields and individual plots
in agricultural farms, yet agricultural producer cooperatives or quasi-feudal landowner-tenant
relationships form the specific context in which their explanations are advanced. Regarding
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producer cooperatives, emphasis is typically put on the existence of scale economies for certain
types of activities, or on the need for insurance and the role of income-pooling (Putterman,
1981, 1985, 1987, 1989; Putterman and DiGiorgio, 1985; Carter, 1987). As for relationships
between estate owners and workers, limited liability constraints and the demand for insurance
are the main motives prompting the adoption of the mixed farm structure (Allen, 1984;
Sadoulet, 1992).
We thus face a relative shortage of pertinent accounts of the existence of individual plots in
the precise setting of family farms. Unlike in democratic producer cooperatives, a hierarchical
relationship prevails in these farms, and in contrast to feudal or semi-feudal estates (where
independent tenants became re-integrated into a seigneurial estate when landlords decided
to embark upon direct cultivation of a portion of their land), their transformation typically
consists of a shift from the pure collective form to the mixed structure.1
The second form of individualization is at the center of Foster and Rosenzweig (2002)
attempt to explain family farm division. They do not allow for individual plots, as for
them co-residence implies collective farming only. In their framework, an extended family is
composed of several claimants to the land who may decide to split if the benefit of sharing
public goods by co-residing is smaller than the loss of efficiency due to decreasing returns to
scale in production. There are thus two different ways of explaining the increasing incidence
of individual farms: (i) growing disinterest of younger generations in the sort of public goods
produced on the collective farm, and (ii) rising importance of decreasing returns to scale as
a result of the shift to more land-intensive agricultural techniques.
1For key references on the working of feudal or semi-feudal estates, see Blum, 1957, 1961; Kliuchevsky,
1968; Kolchin, 1987; Raftis, 1996; Mathur, 1991; Sadoulet, 1992; Conning and Kevane, 2007).
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Clearly related to the latter proposition is the work of Boserup (1965) who attributes
the rise of peasant farms to growing land scarcity and the consequent intensification of agri-
cultural techniques. As land pressure increases, so the argument runs, farmers are induced
to shift to more intensive forms of land use, which implies that they adopt increasingly
land-saving and labour-using techniques. An important characteristic of these techniques
is that labour quality, which is costly to monitor, assumes growing importance. Given the
incentive problems associated with care-intensive activities (sometimes labeled “management
diseconomies of scale”), the small family or peasant farm in which a few co-workers (spouses
and their children) are residual claimants, appears as the most efficient farm structure.
Although Boserup’s story is undeniably appealing, both theoretically and empirically, it
cannot apparently account for situations in which an evolution towards more individualized
family farms takes place in the absence of noticeable technical progress. Thus, in Russia
during the 17-19th centuries, a shift from large and complex agricultural households (married
brothers stay together at least till the death of the father) to smaller and more simple ones
(married brothers part with each other while the father is still alive, but a household may
remain multigenerational) has occurred, a change which historians generally ascribe to the
expansion of non-agricultural opportunities rather than to the adoption of new agricultural
techniques (Worobec, 1995; Moon, 1999). In the old cotton zone of southern Mali (West
Africa), where the authors of this paper did fieldwork, traditionnal collective farms appear
to be increasingly replaced by mixed farms and small farms born of the break-up of large
family farms, despite persisting technological stagnation.
We therefore set out to develop an alternative framework susceptible of explaining individ-
ualization of family farms in conditions of rising land scarcity and technological stagnation.
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Land scarcity implies that the land frontier is closed (and property rights well established),
so that members are not able to leave the household to set up their own farm by clearing
new land. Toward that purpose, we write a simple model in which the three aforementioned
family forms are featured in a static environment characterized by heterogeneous land endow-
ments at farm level and highly imperfect or absent markets. Through comparative statics,
we check whether smaller land assets (or growing needs of members) lead to individualization
of the family farm. It is implicitly assumed that adjustment to rising land pressure is easier
to achieve through change in the family farm organization than through demographic change
and fertility reduction, or through land markets. While fertility reduction requires a long
term horizon, land markets are highly imperfect owing to large transaction costs or because
the fear of losing land prevents the supply side of the market from being activated (Basu,
1986). In this context, any change in land allocation is the outcome of a decision regarding
the organization of the family farm.
The intuition behind our model is simple. When deciding whether to give individual plots
and how large they should be, the family head faces a trade-off between considerations of
efficiency in the use of the land and considerations of rent capture. For one thing, production
is more efficient on private plots than on the collective field where the moral hazard-in-team
problem prevents optimal effort from being applied by family members: when production
is joint, individual farmers have a tendency to slack off (Ray, 1998: 452). Since the head
must ensure that family members agree to stay on the family farm while they have outside
options available to them, awarding individual plots allows him to more easily satisfy their
participation constraints. For another thing, because the head’s income entirely comes from
the collective produce owing to unenforceable transfers from the private plots, competition
7
between the family field and the individual plots for the allocation of effort is bound to
cause a fall in the amount of harvest appropriable by the head. In the case of a pre-mortem
split of the family farm, the total labor force available for work on the collective field also
decreases, whereas it is no more incumbent on the household head to provide for the needs of
the departed members. Depending on the relative importance of the aforementioned effects,
the father may prefer a mixed regime with individual fields to the collective regime, or he
may choose to split the family.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we mention empirical evidence from
southern Mali that is directly relevant for our topic. We focus attention on observations that
come in support of the central assumptions underlying the model presented in Section 3.
In this section, we first set up the model, define each regime and explore the forces at play
when choosing across regimes. In Section 4, we derive analytical results regarding the role
of reservation utility and land pressure in regime choice. In Section 5, we present simulation
results to illustrate the coexistence of the three regimes and further analyze their occurrence
in a reservation utility-land endowment space. Section 6 concludes.
2 A theory of the patriarchal family: supporting evidence
Unique material collected by Russian scholars highlights certain important aspects of the dy-
namic of household formation in Russia during the pre-industrialization period (17th to 20th
century), particularly with respect to the prevalence of extended households and patriarchy,
pre-mortem divisions and distribution of individual plots (see Worobec, 1995; Moon, 1999).
This material, which is summarized in Appendix A for the interested reader, shows that the
8
setup of our theory applies to times and locations that go much beyond today’s West Africa.
This is true despite the fact that, prior to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, Russian rural
communities were governed by strong local authorities known as the Mir. Indeed, decisions
regarding intra-family land allocation belonged to the heads. In the following, we focus on
evidence that we ourselves gathered in Mali, where in 2006 and 2007, we conducted a system-
atic household survey on a random sample of 502 households belonging to 50 different villages
in the districts of Koutiala, San, and Sikasso. In this section we use this data and report
descriptive evidence regarding the simultaneous presence of the three above-described family
farm structures, the views of local patriarchs on this evolution and the key assumptions that
underlie our theoretical approach.
2.1 Observations about the transformation of farm-cum-family struc-
tures
First, in the villages surveyed, the land frontier is closed with the result that local authorities
do not anymore intervene in land allocation decisions (their role is confined to the settlement
of land conflicts). Still, the activity of local land markets is extremely limited in spite of
growing land scarcity (in villages land is no more available for outsiders to settle on). The
great majority of the land parcels (80%) were inherited (post or pre-mortem), while the
remainder were either cleared by the owner a few decades ago (10%), or borrowed by the
household.2 Moreover, the local labour market is hardly developed so that land available per
2Land lending is not synonymous of renting in the sense that no cash or in-kind payment is involved. The
land is often borrowed over several generations. With increasing land pressure, however, conflicts between
owners and borrowers have become more common, frequently because the family which borrowed land a
generation ago is reluctant to return it to the owner.
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unit of labour is not equalized across farms: farms are heterogeneous in terms of land-labour
endowment. On the other hand, household members have outside opportunities available to
them, mostly in the form of migration to Malian cities or neighboring countries. Improved
communication and increased mobility have contributed during the last decades to enhanced
perceptions of potential employment opportunities outside the native village. Finally, the
households are typically not purely subsistence farming units and combine the production of
staples with that of cash crops (cotton in particular).
Extended households and patriarchy
In our sample, 23% of household heads live with their brothers while, at the other extreme,
only 10% have neither brothers nor married sons around (strictly speaking, they are nuclear
households). Moreover almost 60% of the household heads are polygamous. On average the
sample households count 11 individuals above 12 with a maximum family size of 33.
The family system functions as a patriarchy, implying that all important decisions are
taken by the (male) head, in particular those regarding the way land is allocated and income
is distributed on the farm. There are significant facts pointing to the existence of a strongly
patriarchal society in southern Mali. Not only do customary inheritance rules exclude female
members, but there are also compelling clues attesting to the importance of the authority
exercised by the household head. The assumption of patriarchy implies not only that the head
decides whether part of the family land will be earmarked for individual plots or not, but also
whether some members (and how many) will be allowed to form separate branch households
by using a share of the family land. On the collective field, the head is in complete charge
of all important decisions. When individual plots exist, management decisions including the
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choice of crop and supervision of effort belong to the landholding member, yet the allocation
of labor time between the collective field and the individual plot is fixed by the head. Bear in
mind, however, that the ability of the head to set the timetable for work on the collective field
does not imply that he can control the allocation of effective labour effort between collective
and individual activities.
The authority of the head stretches beyond the production sphere. In particular, almost
all heads assert that members must seek their approval before taking a loan, and that they
often avail themselves of this prerogative to refuse permission. They see themselves as acting
on behalf of the family and responsible for its ordered functioning, including the due loans
taken by members.
Finally, there are two important domains in which household heads admit that their
power is limited. The first domain concerns consumption choices made by children who have
independent incomes (from individual plots) and claim the right to spend them according
to their own preferences. In fact, the awarding of individual plots to members goes hand in
hand with the devolution of non-food expenditures to them. The second limitation to the
patriarch’s power arises from his inability to enforce transfers from incomes earned on private
plots. We return to this crucial feature in Subsection 2.2.
Post- and pre-mortem divisions
Family splits occur when some members leave the family farm to form their own inde-
pendent household while the head of the extended family is still alive. About one-fourth of
the sample heads belong to that category and most of them have received a fair share of the
family’s land endowment. According to our respondents this type of pre-mortem division is
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a new phenomenon.3 Traditionally it was only at the death of a patriarch that part of the
family could possibly break-up and be divided into branch households. When a patriarch
rules over four or five generations of his brothers and his brothers’ descendants indeed, the
custom is that sons and nephews of the deceased patriarch found branch households under
the authority of the oldest sibling. In that case, splitting is not, strictly speaking, the out-
come of a decision of the household head. Like in the case of Russia, breakup of the family
farm may also occur when brothers do not get on well enough to operate together in the
absence of the father.
The main reasons given to explain pre-mortem divisions (by head who formed their own
independent household while the head of the extended family was still alive) are rising land
pressure in the family farm (34% of interpretable answers), and the eruption of conflicts
within the family, most often involving their brothers or uncles (again 34%).4 Other reasons
include low production in the stem household, and the existence of special needs that could
not be satisfied if the member had stayed with the whole family (expensive medicine to cure
a wife, for example). We will focus attention on the first eventuality in which land pressure is
the primary cause of family breakups. It must nevertheless be borne in mind that as attested
by well-substantiated evidence, village or community-level conflicts, including intra-family
disputes, are often caused by acute scarcity, real or anticipated, of available land assets.
There may thus be a significant overlap between the two dominant motives alleged to lie
behind household splits (Andre and Platteau, 1998; Haugerud, 1993: 162-176).
Distribution of individual plots
3Unfortunately, no quantitative information is available about this evolution.
4These percentages are based on answers given to open questions that we later classified into categories.
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Not only branch households but also mixed farms are found to coexist with traditional
collective farms in the Koutiala-San-Sikasso region. In particular, individual plots allotted
to male members living on the farm have been observed in about one-fourth of our sample
households. It is noticeable that, when this is the case, all male members above a certain
age have received a private plot. Moreover, the practice of giving out individual plots is on
the increase, and growing land scarcity seems to be associated with this increase: households
which have granted individual plots to (male) members turn out to have significantly less
land per male member (3.01 ha) than those running pure collective farms (3.67 ha).
Perceptions of the family heads regarding the causes of ongoing transforma-
tions
When queried about the reasons underlying the trend toward growing individualization of
family farms, whether in the form of mixed farms or branch households, the heads whom we
interviewed in Mali pointed to increasing land pressure and consumption needs, particularly
among the younger generations. As land becomes scarce, so the first argument runs, family
heads find it increasingly difficult to provide for the subsistence needs of the extended family
from the collective field. They claim that land scarcity leaves them with no other choice
than to let some family members acquire more autonomy through the ability to cultivate
individual plots or to form separate branch households. Another oft-heard explanation refers
to what senior villagers call “modernity”, understood as the greater consumption needs of the
young generations. The rhetoric is that, nowadays, young people have new needs, such as a
motorbike, nice clothes, sometimes even a cellular phone... Analytically, this change may be
captured by an increase in the reservation utility required by household members to continue
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to work and stay with the head. Because they perceive to have better outside opportunities,
typically in the form of migration to Malian cities or neighboring countries, they feel able
to demand a higher level of welfare. Improved communication and increased mobility have
no doubt contributed to these enhanced perceptions of potential employment opportunities
outside the native village. Note the conceptual analogy between the two explanations: an
increase in the extent of needs to be satisfied from a given amount of land appears to be the
converse of a decrease in the amount of land available to satisfy a given extent of needs. In
practice, however, the two outcomes are caused by different forces: rising numbers, on the
one hand, and increased market integration, on the other hand.
2.2 Evidence in support of the key assumptions behind our theory
The theory developed in the subsequent sections rests on three central assumptions that are
derived from key insights obtained in our field research in Mali. The first assumption concerns
the patriarchal form of authority that rules over the family farms. Since it has already been
amply substantiated above, we focus our attention on the other two assumptions, namely:
• Owing to non-observability of individual labour efforts, incentive problems discourage
production on the collective field, especially when effort on this field competes with
effort applied to individual plots.5
• The entire head’s income accruing to the head is obtained from the output of the
collective field because, while this output is observable (as an aggregate) by him, out-
put on individual plots is not easy to monitor. We thus assume away transfers from
5Incentive problems also arise if the head observes effort but chooses to use an equal sharing rule to avoid
intra-family conflicts.
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individual plot holders to the patriarch. This assumption is consonant with the obser-
vations reported in numerous anthropological studies (see Duflo and Udry, 2004, for
references).6
First, regarding the incentive problems plaguing collective production, many heads have
explicitly referred to them while discussing the practice of individual plots. For them, the
main shortcoming of such plots is that family members tend to relax their effort on the
collective field, thereby impairing yields.7 Complaints such as “more effort is applied to the
individual plots and when members work on the collective plot, they are tired” or “members
are prone to keep energy in reserve for their individual plots”8 are commonly expressed by
family heads. They suggest that the granting of individual plots exacerbates the problem of
moral-hazard-in-team on the collective field.9 On the other hand, differentiating payments
according to individual effort contributions to collective production is hard not only because
such contributions may not be easy to measure but also because as has been stressed by
family heads in the interviews, accusations of favoritism or unfair treatment will be inevitably
aroused by this practice, leading to vicious intra-family conflicts.
As far as our second assumption is concerned, the crucial fact is that members who
cultivate an individual plot tend to keep the entire production for their own consumption,
or that of their children. Only 6% of them “helped” the household head in the previous year
6In their words, “A voluminous literature makes it clear that individuals have substantive control over
decision on their plots, and that nominal control over the output from a plot belongs to the cultivators.”
7The same incentive problem is mentioned in the context of feudal estates by Conning and Kevane (2007).
8In the French parlance used by our interlocutors, members possessing private plots “se réservent”.
9Another shortcoming of individual plots which has been frequently cited by our respondents is the risk
of intra-family tensions and conflicts arising from the coexistence of collective and individual activities. Such
risk is linked to the moral-hazard-in-team problem since manifestations of labour shirking may easily prompt
accusations of misbehaviour among family members.
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through transfers in cash or in kind, and when they do occur such transfers are typically
very small. It is revealing that a large majority of household heads admit that members who
possess an individual plot have no obligation to transfer income to them. Also revealing is the
fact that most household heads consider that, when individual plots are awarded, they are
no more responsible for the financing of marriage-related expenditures including brideprice
payments. Such expenses now befall the holders of individual plots.
Note that we refrain from establishing a strict parallel between the above-described patri-
archal farm and feudal land estates in which the landlord extracts his rent from the coerced
labor of tenants working for him during a prescribed portion of their available time. Although
a family is potentially vulnerable to internal exploitation mechanisms, especially so if it has
a patriarchal structure (see, e.g., Barthez, 1982), it is also a joint undertaking in which mem-
bers produce as a team, participate in collective consumption, life events and rituals, as well
as share common identities and values. Work on the collective field is seen as contribution
to the family’s welfare and the prevailing sharing rule conveys the idea of partnership rather
than class-based antagonisms. There is thus no coerced labor in the sense of free compulsory
labor, and unless we believe that common identities and values are all the outcome of a ’false
consciousness’, we are not entitled to look at the patriarchal family as though it was only
a disguised form of feudal exploitation. The key feature to be borne in mind is that in our
framework, the patriarch encourages collective production for the purpose of rent extraction,
regardless of its disadvantages from the standpoint of efficiency.
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3 A simple model of family farm structure
3.1 Two important clarifications
Before we present the formal structure of our theory, we need to address two important
questions the answers to which will condition the way we set up our model. The first question
concerns the mode of remuneration of household members for their effort on the collective
field, whereas the second question has to do with the nature of the participation constraint
in the event of splitting. Let us examine them in turn.
3.1.1 Contractual form
Given the specific context of the family farm, a share system appears as the (second-best)
efficient contract even when risk considerations are abstracted from. In fact, a fixed rent
contract is not a feasible arrangement in a mixed farm in which effort is more efficiently
applied on the individual plots than on the collective field. In other words, the situation
in which the head would simultaneously opt for a mixed farm structure (implying division
of the available land into both a collective field and individual plots) and charge a fixed
rent for the use of the land in the collective field, does not correspond to a Nash equilibrium.
Assuming that the head uses a mixed share-cum-fixed-rent contract, he could always raise his
rent by marginally decreasing his share of the harvest and increasing the fixed component.
This is because he would thereby mitigate the efficiency losses that result from the share
system on the collective field. As a result, the value of the share parameter tends to zero,
and the fixed component absorbs the whole production on that field, leaving the members
forced to achieve their reservation utility entirely from the output of their private plots.
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Such an outcome, however, cannot be an equilibrium: since members would not obtain any
reward from their work efforts on the collective field, they would not put in any effort and
the head would receive zero income. The conclusion is that a mixed farm system may be an
equilibrium only if the head’s rent is a pure share of collective production. Or, conversely, if
the head charges a fixed rent for the use of his land, the farm must have a purely collective
form. A formal proof of this result is available in Guirkinger and Platteau (2014).10
We may also justify this assumption by resorting to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)’s two
sided moral-hazard argument. According to them the contract choice problem can be framed
as a trade-off between the need to provide tenants with adequate incentive to apply effort,
on the one hand, and the need to use the landowner’s management skills to the best possible
extent, on the other hand. When the relative advantage of the landowner in using his
management skills and the relative advantage of the tenant in using his supervision abilities
are sufficiently important, Eswaran and Kotwal show that the share contract dominates
the fixed rent contract (in which the landowner’s management skills are poorly used but
labour incentives are optimally generated) and the fixed time wage rate system (in which the
workers have no incentive to apply any effort but the landowner is optimally induced to use
his management skills).11
10It has been shown that the arrangement in which efforts on a collective field are rewarded by free access
to a private plot is actually equivalent to a sharecropping contract that would be applied on the whole farm
area (Allen, 1984). But this arrangement is not a realistic option since it implies that effort on the collective
field can be monitored costlessly so that first-best efficiency is attained on both types of landholdings. It is
typically justified by risk-sharing considerations.
11In a mixed farm, family members apply effort to both the collective field and their private plot, yet when
cultivating the latter they also use their own management skills which they have learned while working on the
former (bear in mind that members receive a private plot only when they reach adult age). On the private
plots, therefore, members exercise management skills which they are prevented from using on the collective
field. The question arises as to why the head does not use the management skills of the members instead of
his own on the collective field. The answer is that management responsibilities need to be integrated under a
18
3.1.2 Participation constraint
So far, we have pointed out that household members have a reservation utility that the head
must satisfy in order to keep them in the native community. At the same time, we have
observed that the standard practice (in both Russia and Mali) in the event of splitting is
for the head to let some of his sons set up their own independent farm on the portion of
family land to which they are rightfully entitled under the customary patriarchal inheritance
system (equal division of the land among all sons). In fact, it is only when a (male) member
decides to leave the family against the wish of the living head that he may be disinherited
as a punishment for his rebellious decision.12 In other works, when (male) members leave
the stem household with the consent of the head, they obtain their whole inheritance share
pre-mortem.
In keeping with this observation, we assume below that when he contemplates the pos-
sibility of splitting the stem household, the head compares the rent which he obtains under
the status quo (either the pure collective or the mixed farm) with the rent that he would get
if he were to let one, two or more male members quit with their rightful share of the family
land. The utility thus achieved by an independent (male) member of the family is not smaller
than the reservation utility (since this would imply that the farm size is not large enough
single authority: if they were delegated to family members, a serious coordination problem would be created,
and the head would be compelled to continuously intervene to settle disruptive conflicts. The implication is
that, when a whole team of family members are involved in joint production, the role of unifying management
decisions is critical, hence the significant relative advantage of the head in using his management skills when
production is a joint activity (for a similar argument made in the context of small-scale marine fishing, see
Platteau and Nugent, 1992).
12Note that, since it is not the outcome of the head’s decision, or at least an agreement with him, we
do not model this kind of eventuality which in any event appears to be rare in our study area. Our focus
is on the question of the optimal farm-cum-family structure that the household head wants to establish or
maintain, given that he has to make the best possible living from it while satisfying the reservation utilities
of the members.
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to enable all dependents to reach the reservation utility in a first best case of productive
efficiency.) This causes a discrepancy between the utility of those sons who stay within the
stem household and the utility of those who have left to form independent households. The
advantage thus gained by the latter may be temporary in so far as the first members to
leave are the elder, earlier married sons who are perhaps going to be succeeded later by their
younger brothers. It may also be more apparent than real if the independent sons have a
(larger) family to sustain.
Because we want to keep the model as simple as possible - as we shall see, even a simple
model of the kind envisaged is not easily tractable - we abstract away from complications
arising from the age structure and demographic characteristics of the family. All sons are thus
assumed to be identical, and we do not highlight the possible factors justifying differences in
(reservation) utility between remaining and departing members.
When we discuss our results, we will nonetheless return to the case that we have just
ruled out. The assumption of a uniform participation constraint which holds in all the three
regimes implies that, in the event of splitting, a departing member would receive an amount of
land just sufficient to afford him the reservation utility. It will be evident that the predictions
obtainable under such conditions are much less rich than those derived from our basic model.
3.2 The general framework
A household head has N male family members of whom n live and farm with him, and N−n
have formed independent households. The male members who left each received an equitable
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share of the father’s total land endowment, A.13 This area, A
N
, can be seen as a pre-mortem
inheritance transfer. Thus, when the father chooses to let N−n members leave the extended
family to form their own separate households, the area remaining for the extended family
farm is A = nA
N
. Labor on the stem household’s farm is supplied by male members who have
stayed with the head. The agricultural production function is f(a, l), where a is land and
l is labor. An individual’s utility is x − v(l), where x is the production that the individual
consumes and l the level of labour he exerts. The function v(l) is the disutility of labor.
The head allocates available land A between a collective field, where the male members
work together, and individual fields, where each works individually and for his own bene-
fit. We assume that members operating inside the extended family farm receive an equal
treatment with respect to both the division of the produce of the collective field (hence the
existence of a moral-hazard-in-team problem) and the apportioning of the land earmarked
for individual farming. Therefore, if the head decides to grant individual plots, each member
receives AI ≤ A
n
.
Members consume the whole production of their individual fields, implying that the fa-
ther’s entire consumption R is obtained from his share α ≤ 1 of the output produced on the
collective field, A−nAI , R = αf(−).14 In keeping with our field observations again, we thus
assume that there is no possibility of income transfer from household members to the head.
When AI = 0, we say that the farm structure or regime is a pure collective farm, whereas if
13We focus on male members in this paper. Women do not inherit land in the patriarchal societies we have
in mind. As a result a women departure is not accompanied by the split of the farm land. Furthermore,
while women may be awarded individual plots, those are much smaller and their awarding follow different
logic. We discuss this point in Guirkinger and Platteau (2014).
14This implies that the moral-hazard-in-team problem cannot be overcome through the choice of appropri-
ate contracts of a more requiring form. We justify this assumption in Section 5.1.
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AI > 0, it is mixed.
One unit of labor, whether applied on the collective field or on the individual plot, causes
the same disutility . Therefore, member’s j utility can be written as xj − v(lCj + lIj ), where
xj is the sum of the share received from the collective field and the production from his
individual plot, lCj is the level of effort applied to the collective field, and lIj that applied to
the individual field. Members have an outside option that provides them utility u, giving
rise to a participation constraint.
The problem is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the head chooses α,AI and n. In
the second stage, members observe these choices and individually decide how much effort to
apply to the collective field and how much to their individual plot. We restrict our attention
to symmetric Nash equilibria in the second stage. This allows us to solve for a single pair
(lC , lI), and to write the whole problem as follows:
Max n,α,AIR = αf
(
A− nAI , nlC) (1)
s.t. : {lC , lI} = Argmax
lCj ,l
I
j
1− α
n
f
(
A− nAI , lCj + (n− 1)lC
)
+ f
(
AI , lIj
)− v(lCj + lIj ) (2)
lC ≥ 0 and lI ≥ 0 (3)
u ≤ 1− α
n
f
(
A− nAI , nlC)+ f (AI , lI)− v(lC + lI) (4)
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (5)
0 ≤ nAI ≤ A (6)
A =
nA
N
(7)
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Total labor on the collective field in the incentive compatibility constraint is written
lCj +(n−1)lC to stress that each member takes the behavior of others as given when deciding
how much effort to apply to that field.
Note carefully that collective production, as represented by the expression 1−α
n
f (−), is
plagued by two types of inefficiencies: one arises from the use of a share contract (only a
share (1−α) accrues to the members) and the other from the moral-hazard-in-team problem
(the joint output is divided in equal shares among them). It is therefore on a double count
that the marginal productivity of labor effort exceeds the marginal cost when we write the
first-order condition of the agent’s problem (the IC constraint).
3.3 Giving out individual plots?
A first question to ask is the following: under which conditions does a household head find
it optimal to distribute part of the family land to male members for private use, when n
members remain on the farm to cultivate A? The problem is not trivial since there are two
forces working in opposite directions. On the one hand, unlike the collective field, individual
plots are used efficiently. As a consequence, a smaller amount of land has to be dedicated to
meeting the members’ reservation utility under a mixed system than under a pure collective
regime. On the other hand, the opportunity cost to work on the collective field increases
when there is competition between the family field and private plots. This is because the
worker is a full residual claimant on the latter whereas on the former he suffers from both
the moral-hazard-in-team problem and the disincentive effect of the share system of labour
remuneration. Labor allocation to the land wherefrom the father derives his income therefore
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decreases sharply.
Unfortunately there is no explicit solution for the head’s rent in either regime, even when
a Cobb-Douglas production function and a quadratic cost of effort are posited. As a result,
we cannot directly compare the head’s rent between regimes. To understand the underlying
logic of the model, however, it is useful to analyze the trade-offs faced by the head when he
decides to allocate individual plots. We consider the problem in a sequential manner. First,
let us define α∗(AI) which is the optimal α for a given AI . Let us now examine how the value
function of this degenerate problem varies when AI changes. If ∂V
∂AI
(α∗(AI)) < 0 for all AI
such that 0 < AI ≤ A
n
, the head will not allocate individual fields, while if, ∂V
∂AI
(α∗(AI)) > 0
over some range, the head may choose to allocate individual fields.
Suppose that AI is fixed. When there exist both a collective field and individual plots, we
can replace the members’ maximization problem with the first-order conditions with respect
to lC and lI and write the following Lagrangian (both lC and lI are strictly positive):
L
(
lC , lI , α
)
= αf
(
A− nAI , nlC)− λ(v′(lC + lI)− 1− α
n
fL(
nA
N
− nAI , nlC)
)
−µ (v′(lC + lI)− fL (AI , lI))
−ν
(
u− 1− α
n
f
(
nA
N
− nAI , nlC
)
− f (AI , lI)+ v(lC + lI))
(8)
In order to analyze the sign of ∂R
∂AI
, we apply the Envelop Theorem which yields the
following expression:
∂V
∂AI
=
∂L
∂AI
= −nαfCA − λ(1− α)fLA(A− nAI , nlC) + µfLA
(
AI , lI
)
− ν(1− α)fA(A− nAI , nlC) + νfA
(
AI , lI
) (9)
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This expression reveals that as AI increases (by one unit), the size of the collective field
decreases (by n units), and the first term indicates how, everything else being constant,
the family head’s rent declines with the size of the field from which it is extracted. The
second term captures the lower incentives for male members to work on the collective field
as AI increases (we show in Appendix, section B.2.1 and B.2.2, that λ is positive). For
a given amount of effort, indeed, the marginal product of labour falls when land becomes
smaller. The third term reflects the negative impact on R caused by the enlarged size of
the individual plots: members have more incentive to spend effort on their individual plot
because the marginal productivity of labour has increased for a given amount of effort. As
a result, the cost of their effort on the collective field is now higher (we show in Appendix,
section B.2.1 and B.2.2, that µ is negative).
The last two terms of equation 9 indicate how a change in AI modifies the participa-
tion constraint, and how this affects the head’s utility (bear in mind that ν ≥ 0 since the
head’s rent increases if the participation constraint is relaxed). Other things being equal
(the distribution of labour efforts being constant), reallocation of land from the collective
field to individual plots has the effect of enhancing the ability to produce u on the latter
and simultaneously decreasing the ability to do so on the former. Measured by the marginal
productivity of land in the two locations, this combined effect is positive overall because
incentive problems exist on the collective field but not on the individual plots.15
It is therefore possible that, over some range of AI values, ∂R∗
∂AI
> 0, implying that the
15Indeed, assuming constant returns to scale, we have fA(AI , lI) > fA(A−nAI , nlC). This follows directly
from the first order conditions of dependents’ labor allocation which implies fL(AI , lI) < fL(A− nAI , nlC),
and the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function. A fortiori, we then have that: −ν(1−α)fA(A−
nAI , nlC) + νfA
(
AI , lI
)
> 0.
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household head may prefer the mixed regime over the pure collective regime.16
3.4 Splitting the family
To understand the effects of splitting the family, we examine the effects of a unit increase in
the number of members who stay within the family farm.
Whether in the pure collective or in the mixed regime, if the head decides to keep one
more member with him, the impact on his rent can be formally defined as follows:
dR
dn
=
(
∂A
∂n
− AI − n∂A
I
∂n
)
αfA + l
CαfL + n
∂lC
∂n
αfL +
∂α
∂n
f (10)
The four terms have an intuitive interpretation. The first term in both expressions is the
land endowment effect. When one more member stays on the farm area, the total farm is
bigger (when a male member leaves, he receives a fraction 1
N
of the total land endowment
of the family, A), but the collective field does not increase by this full amount in the mixed
regime since the additional member receives and individual plot. Furthermore the head may
adjust the size of all individual plots as a response to the change in family size. The second
term is the labour endowment effect : the increase in the size of the labour force working on
the collective field has a positive direct effect on total production. The last two terms are
linked to incentives. We label the third term the labour incentive effect, and the fourth term
the compensation effect. The third term indicates how the individual incentive to work on the
16In fact, if there exists an interior solution to the head’s problem, it occurs at a point where the partici-
pation constraint binds. Indeed if the sons are able to achieve their reservation utility by just relying on the
production of their individual fields, ν = 0, and the head’s rent is unambiguously decreasing in the size of
individual plots. This case is treated in Appendix, section B.2.1.
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collective field is eroded when an additional member stays on the farm, thereby accentuating
the moral-hazard-in-team problem. We show in Appendix (section B.3.1 for the case of a split
occurring in the collective regime, and section B.3.2 for the case of a split occurring in the
mixed regime) that, as expected, this term is negative. The fourth term, finally, depicts how
the head adapts his rent to the constraint of providing for the subsistence of an additional
member. We prove in Appendix (sections B.3.1 and B.3.2) that this term is also negative
because ∂α
∂n
< 0: by way of adjusting to the deteriorated work incentives (on the collective
field) and to the necessity of feeding one more mouth, the head allows male members to keep
a greater share of the collective field’s production.
Reasoning in the converse way, an important lesson to draw from the ambiguous sign
of ∂R
∂n
is that, by inducing a son to leave the stem household and form a branch household,
the family head is not certain to increase his own income. This is in spite of the fact that
he does not have anymore to provide for the consumption needs of the departing son and
that the incentives to work on the collective field improve for the members who stay on the
farm. There are, indeed effects working in the opposite direction: the departing son stops
working on the collective field, and is moreover offered a share of the family land assets that
is subtracted from the land available to the residual stem household.
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4 The effects of land scarcity and increasing consumption
needs
4.1 Analytical results
Recall that one of the main reasons given by local elders for the increasing prevalence of
mixed farms, and of family splits, is the increase in land pressure. In terms of our model,
such increase may be measured by a decrease of the land endowment, for a given family size.
The other main reason is that (male) members have greater consumption needs than in the
past. This change may be captured by an increase in the reservation utility, u.
In this section, we test whether these explanations can be supported by our theoretical
framework. We examine first how the head’s incentive to give out individual plots changes
with the family land endowment and the members’ reservation utility. We then examine how
the head’s incentive to split the family is affected by the same variables. In each case we
summarize our results in a proposition and refer the reader to the Appendix for a presentation
of the complete formal proofs. These results are derived on the basis of a Cobb-Douglas
production function (f(a, l) = al1−) and a quadratic cost of effort (v(l) = ωl2). Before
embarking upon such a task, however, we want to establish a set of intermediary results that
concern the evolution of the head’s share, α. More precisely, we wish to determine how α
changes (1) when land becomes more scare and the reservation utility of members increases
within the domain of the strictly collective regime or the collective regime, and (2) when the
head decides to shift from the former to the latter regime.
We show that, in accordance with intuition, the head lowers his share of collective output
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when, within the strictly collective or the mixed regime, land becomes more scarce or the
members’ reservation utility is raised (see Appendix C.1) for the detailed proof). Lemma 1
states this result.
Lemma 1 When, under either the strictly collective or the mixed regime, the family head is
confronted with more constraining conditions in the form of a reduction of A or an increase
in u, he responds by decreasing his share of the collective output, α. Furthermore, when A
tends to 0 or u tends to +∞, α tends to zero.
Much less clear is the case where a regime shift occurs, because two contrary effects are
at work when competition emerges between the collective and the individual fields. On the
one hand, being keen to mitigate the effects of such a competition, the head raises the share
of collective output accruing to members so as to incite them to apply effort to the common
field. On the other hand, he wants to make precisely the opposite move in order to make up
for the unavoidable decrease in the level of collective output from which he draws his entire
income. We show that the second effect outweighs the first, thus establishing the following
lemma (proof in Appendix C.2:
Lemma 2 When the family head decides to shift from the purely collective to the mixed
regime, he simultaneously raises his own share of the output obtained on the collective field.
Let us now look at the effect of land endowment and reservation utility on the choice
between the mixed and the pure collective regimes. It is stated in Proposition 1 (proof in
Appendix C.3).
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Proposition 1 When land is very abundant, or the workers’ utility is very low, the head
always prefers a pure collective farm to a mixed structure where male members have individ-
ual plots that they cultivate for their own benefit. When either land becomes scarce or the
reservation utility increases, however, the mixed structure may become more attractive.
Specifically, if the head of a collective farm is just indifferent between operating the farm
as a pure collective unit or as a mixed unit, a marginal decrease in land endowment or a
marginal increase in the reservation utility induces him to strictly prefer the mixed regime
over the collective regime. Conversely, a marginal increase in land endowment or a marginal
decreases in the reservation utility induces him to strictly prefer the pure collective regime.
Since we cannot prove the existence of a level of land endowment (or of reservation utility)
for which the head would be indifferent between the two regimes, we must distinguish two
cases. Indeed, as A goes from +∞ to 0 (or as u goes from 0 to +∞), either the collective
farm remains superior over the full range of land endowment (or reservation utility), or the
mixed farm dominates below a critical level of land endowment (or reservation utility).
Next, let us consider the effect of land endowment and reservation utility on the choice
between splitting the family and keeping it whole (proof in Appendix C.4).
Proposition 2 When land is very abundant or when the members’ reservation utility is
very low, the head of a purely collective farm will not accept to let some male members leave
with a portion 1/N of the land endowment. Conversely, when land is very scarce or the
members’ utility is very high, the head of a purely collective farm or a mixed farm will choose
to split the family and let some members leave with a portion 1/N of the land. Furthermore,
there exists a unique level of land endowment 0 < A < +∞ that makes the head of a purely
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collective farm just indifferent between letting some male members leave with a portion 1/N
of the family land, and keeping the family whole. Similarly, there exists a unique level of
reservation utility 0 < u < +∞ such that the head is indifferent between keeping the family
whole or splitting it.
In short, these four propositions reveal that for large A or small u, the pure collective
regime dominates the mixed regime and the head will not split the family. Conversely, for
small A or large u, the mixed regime may dominate the collective regime, and whichever
of these two regimes prevails, some splitting will occur. While the analytical exploration of
the role of land endowment and members’ reservation utility confirms our intuition about
the role of these two factors, it does not yield a complete set of predictions. For example,
we cannot be sure that for small values of A, a family head operating in the pure collective
regime will not choose to shift to the mixed regime before splitting the family. Hence the
need to resort to simulation in order to obtain results that allow to examine whether in a
(A, u) space, the mixed, the split and the pure collective regimes actually coexist.
4.2 Simulation results
Our simulation work is summarized in Figure 1 where the family land endowment is
measured along the vertical axis and the members’ reservation utility along the horizontal
axis.17 What are the main results emerging from this figure?
17The simulation is conducted using the software Mathematica. For a given (A, u,N), for all 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
we numerically solve for the head’s share in both regime. In the mixed regime, when he gives out individual
31
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
To
ta
l l
an
d 
en
do
w
m
en
t 
Reservation utility 
Farm structures (N fixed) 
Strictly	  collec+ve	  
Split	  (with	  no	  individual	  plots)	  
Mixed	  
Split	  (with	  individual	  plots)	  
Nega+ve	  rent	  
Figure 1: Partition of the land endowment - reservation utility space into regimes.
plots and for decreasing sizes of the collective field. Practically, in the case of the results presented below, we
decrease the size of the collective field by steps of 0.25. In Mathematica we use the command “FindRoot”, to
obtain α when the participation constraint binds. For each n, we then compute the head’s rent for each size
of the collective field and compare it to his rent in the collective regime. For each n we thus know whether
the head will choose to give out individual plots, and the maximum rent the head can obtain when he keeps
n members on the family farm. Comparing the head’s rent over the range of n, we determine whether the
head prefers to split the family (n < N), or not (n = N). Recall that the functionnal forms used are
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To begin with, the results analytically obtained in the previous section stand confirmed.
First, the pure collective regime ais prefered by the patriarch to all the other regimes in
the upper left portion corresponding to small values of u. Moreover, the triangle-like shape
of the strictly collective zone indicates that the smaller the reservation utility u, the lower
the threshold value of A above which the pure collective regime dominates the alternative
regimes (the zone expands in size as we move to the left in the upper part of the graph). In
other words, pure collective farms may subsist even in conditions of acute land scarcity but
only provided that exit opportunities for members are sufficiently bad. Conversely, they may
withstand the pressure of rising outside opportunities if land is sufficiently abundant.
Second, the area corresponding to the pure collective regime lies entirely above the areas
corresponding to the mixed regime, collective farming-cum-splitting and splitting with indi-
vidual plots. Third, when the head operates his farm under the pure collective regime and A
becomes sufficiently small (or u sufficiently large), he chooses to split the family. And when
the head operates a mixed farm and A becomes sufficiently small (or u sufficiently large),
he also chooses to split the family. Fourth, the mixed regime emerges as the optimal farm
structure when the reservation utility is not too small and the farmland area is not too large.
The use of simulation also brings to light a number of results that cannot be derived
analytically, and therefore add to the knowledge acquired in the previous section. The main
finding here concerns the sequence in which optimal regimes succeed each other, as we vary
the values of A or u. As A is marginally lowered, or u is marginally raised, a head operating a
pure collective farm may split the family while clinging to collective farming in the remaining
portion of the stem household. When A is lowered, or u raised, to a larger extent still, the
f(a, l) = al1− and v(l) = ωl2. The parameters used are: N = 10, ε = 0.7 and ω = 0.5.
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head may instead choose the mixed farm in which all members stay in the stem household
but obtain access to individual plots. Finally, when the change in u or A values is made even
greater, splitting the family while granting individual plots to the members who stay with
the head becomes the optimal regime. Interestingly the obtained succession of regimes also
indicate how various farm structure compare in terms of their relative allocative efficiency:
the tightening of the participation constraint forces the patriarch to increase efficiency (at
the expense of rent extraction). It thus appear that in our model set-up that the mixed
regime is superior to a partial split with no individual plots.
Why is it that as land becomes more scarce, or as exit options of family members im-
prove beyond a point, spliting the family farm without distributing individual plots becomes
preferable to collective farming even before the mixed regime (which, on the face of it, is a
less individualized form) becomes optimal? While we are not in a position to know whether
this is a general result or whether it depends on the functional forms tested in the simulation,
we can offer the following interpretation. While we allow for partial splits of the family, when
the patriarch distributes individual plots he makes a binary decision (to give plots to all male
members or to none). There is thus an asymmetry between the two regimes in terms of their
degree of flexibility. As a result a partial split may prove superior to the mixed farm struc-
ture (while more complete splits would not). Indeed, the split regime evinces great flexibility
inasmuch as the head chooses how many members to let go. Both regimes entail a reduction
of the farm area devoted to the collective field so that (some) members can produce on their
own plot to meet (part of) their needs. Correspondingly, a portion of the workforce ceases
to be available for the collective field. When the head decides a split without distributing
individual plots, this decrease takes on the form of a reduced number of workers with the
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attendant result that the moral-hazard-in-team problem is mitigated. But this is not the case
under the mixed regime. There is thus an obvious tradeoff between the size of the workforce
available to work on the collective field (larger under the mixed regime) and the extent of the
moral-hazard-in-team problem (also greater under the mixed regime). What our (simulation)
results indicate is that the latter, adverse effect outweighs the former beneficial effect when
land is not too scarce (or the reservation utility is not too high), while the reverse is true
when land scarcity (or the reservation utility) exceeds a certain threshold.
5 Caveat and alternative frameworks
5.1 Caveat
Our main caveat concerns the theoretical possibility of eliminating or mitigating the moral
hazard in team problem. Indeed, the contract theory literature proposes several solutions
susceptible of achieving this (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). We implicitly assume that
these solutions which include punishing the team of agents or stimulating competition among
them are not feasible in our empirical context. An example of the former solution arises when
aggregate output is observable (as in our farm), and this information is used by the head
to punish the workers as a whole for excessive shirking. In particular, if observation of
aggregate output reveals that first-best effort levels were not applied, the head could refuse
any labour payment. Such drastic punishment, however, is not conceivable in a poor economy
where farm members critically depend on collective production for their livelihood, and where
guaranteeing subsistence to all members is a customary duty of the head of a family. Another
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important customary duty of the head is to preserve the unity and harmony of the family.
This objective makes the second type of solution inapplicable. As we have already pointed
out earlier, indeed, differentiation of labour payments among members (assuming that the
head has sufficient clues about individual efforts to rank them) is bound to cause frustrations,
recriminations and accusations of injustice.
5.2 An alternative framework with an altruistic family head
Relaxing the assumption of a strictly selfish patriarch at the head of the farm and simultane-
ously removing the participation constraint provide interesting insights into the functioning
of our model. More precisely, it reveals that the key feature driving the comparative static
results lies in the participation constraints. As a matter of fact, it is the tightening of these
constraints under conditions of improved outside opportunities for members, or of growing
land scarcity, that induces the family head to put more weight on efficiency considerations
so as to be able to satisfy them. As we know, this implies a transformation of the farm-cum-
family structure toward more individualized forms. We may thus consider the alternative
framework in which there is no participation constraint, but the head has an altruistic utility
function, in the sense that it attaches a positive weight to the members’ welfare while making
his allocative decisions.
When we work out the numerical solutions to this newly defined problem, we find that
the three farm-cum-family structures may again arise, yet it is only for relatively high levels
of altruism that individualized forms are preferred by the head. The second finding, however,
contradicts the comparative-static results obtained under the initial model: the farm-cum-
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family structure chosen is insensitive to variations in land pressure. This is because, when
conditions become more stringent, the head now has the ability to transfer part of the welfare
loss to the members whereas he had to operate under binding participation constraints in
the base model. Thus, if he is sufficiently selfish to prefer the pure collective farm structure,
he will stick to it under conditions of increasingly severe land pressure. Efficiency gains are
thereby lost in conditions where they matter much, yet this is not the main concern of the
head since by accepting a reduction of the collective field, his income loss would be greater
than when the farm remains purely collective. In other words, in the absence of participation
constraints, an increase in land pressure does not affect the outcome of the trade-off between
efficiency in production and the head’s ability to extract incomes.
5.3 An alternative framework with a uniform participation con-
straint
Let us now assume that the participation constraint is uniformly defined across the three
regimes that is, in the case of a split, a departing member leaves with just enough land to
reach u on his new farm. In that case, predictions regarding the transformation of the farm-
cum-family structure are much weaker than those achieved in the base model. In particular,
if we can still predict that, when land becomes very scarce, the head of a purely collective
farm or a mixed farm will choose to split the family (at least in part) it is no more possible
to assert that this strategy will never be observed when land is very abundant. The reason is
straightforward: if land is abundant and the reservation utility is low, the family head may
find it profitable to let some male members to leave the farm. This is because ensuring the
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leaving members their low reservation utility implies that they will receive a small amount
of land and this may well be a low price to pay to improve efficiency by mitigating the
moral-hazard-in-team problem.
6 Conclusion
On the basis of a stylized representation of a patriarchal family farm, and in a context of
absent land markets but well-established property rights (implying that the land frontier is
closed), it is possible to use a simple analytical structure to account for possible transfor-
mations of the family farm. In our setting, the family head or patriarch decides about the
allocation of the family land between the collective field and the private plots, and about the
way income on the collective field is distributed between the (male) family workforce and
himself. We then show that, as land scarcity increases, or as exit options available to family
members improve (say, as a result of growing market integration), the pure collective farm
will unavoidably become inferior to alternative farm structures from the standpoint of the
family head who draws his entire income from a share of the collectively produced harvest.
One of these alternative forms is a mixed farm structure combining a collective field with
individual plots of land. When a competition thus exists between these two types of fields,
the reward function on the collective field is a share contract (the fixed-rent contract is not a
Nash equilibrium). Another possible form is a regime in which branch households are formed
as a result of the decision of the patriarch to allow the split of the family farm and the con-
comitant division of the extended family’s assets. In the remaining part of the family farm,
collective cultivation may be combined with individual fields, but this is not a necessity. As
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the number of (male) members leaving the stem household may be any number between zero
and the total number of them in that household, there is a large variety of alternative forms
to the pure collective farm, and each of them needs to be considered in a comparison between
possible farm structures.
In spite of the analytical simplicity of the basic farm structure contemplated in our model,
a complete comparison proves impossible, compelling us to resort to simulation in order to
obtain a complete mapping of regime choice into a reservation utility/land endowment space.
The most significant result is the following: as land scarcity increases (or as exit options for
members improve), splitting the main household while sticking to the pure collective mode of
operation in its remaining portion appears to be the first alternative farm organization able
to supersede the pure collective farm. It is only at higher levels of scarcity (or exit option
levels) that the mixed farm structure becomes the optimal organization from the patriarch’s
standpoint. And it is at still higher levels that splitting combined with individual plots in
the remaining stem household emerges as the best solution.
The above result critically hinges on the existence of participation constraints. In the
absence of such constraints, an increase in land pressure does not affect the outcome of the
trade-off between efficiency in production and the head’s ability to extract incomes. This
is evident when we assume that the family head is altruistic. Other variants of our model
have less significant consequences. For instance, assuming that members with individual
plots can make income transfers in favor of the family head would, for obvious reasons, make
the pure collective farm less appealing than alternative forms. Furthermore, if we assume
that the disutility of effort is greater on the collective field than on the individual plots,
the case of individualization is again strengthened. In the other way around, the presence
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of scale economies in the production of the collective field and in the consumption of the
collective produce would enhance the advantages of the collective farm and enlarge the region
of its feasibility. Likewise, the presence of fixed costs, such as storage costs, increases the
advantage of mixed farms over branch households as a way of individualizing the collective
farm structure as land becomes more scarce. Finally, allowing for dynamic considerations of
the sort considered by Boserup could only reinforce our conclusion that rising land pressure
leads to more individualized farm-cum-family structures.18 One of the main merits of our
model is actually to show that individualization of farm units can result from land scarcity
even in the absence of induced technical change. It is the sheer pressure of growing land
values as a result of population growth and market integration that compels the patriarchs
bent upon maximizing their rents to attach more importance to efficiency considerations lest
the participation constraints of their members should be violated.
18In a dynamic setup of the model, one might wish to assume that allowing the departure of members
to form separate branch households is a more irreversible step than granting individual plots to staying
members. This would obviously reinforce the case for the mixed farm structure.
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Appendix
A Farm-cum-family structures in Russia in the sixteenth-
nineteenth centuries
The following account relies mainly on the analysis of the available historical material by
Worobec (1995), henceforth labeled WO, and Moon (1999) and Moon (2006), henceforth
labeled MO1 and MO2, respectively. When other sources are used, they are referred to in
the conventional manner.
Extended households and patriarchy
A large proportion of peasant households were composed of extended families compris-
ing several conjugal units, at least before the emancipation (1861). Pre-mortem household
divisions then constituted a departure from the norm (WO: 88, 107), implying that “most
newly married couples spent at least the first part of their married lives in the household of
one set of parents” (MO1: 179). Exceptions to the rule of post-mortem division were mostly
found among the households of Siberia and the outlying parts of the forest heartland, which
explains why at any given point in time households tended to be smaller and simpler in these
areas than in the central black earth region and other steppe regions as well as in the forest
heartland (MO1: 170).19
Extended households were placed under the authority of the head, or patriarch. The
19For a proper analysis of the dynamic analysis of peasant households, David Moon thus emphasizes the
need to distinguish between households that divide before and those that divide after the death of the head,
rather than between simple and complex households. In other words, the key difference is between two types
of household life cycles: the “phases of development” cycle and the“perennial complex household” cycle (MO:
179).
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patriarch of the Russian peasant household “held absolute power over management of the
household economy and the labour input of family members” (WO: 11). This implied that
the head could encourage a son to take a job at a domestic industry, in which case he would
have “to remit his wages, minus any expenses incurred while he was away on the job, to the
household’s coffers” (WO: 11).
Household divisions typically took place at the death of the patriarch, often as a result
of internal tensions. It is rather easy to understand why families may split after the death
of the father. In the words of Christine Worobec: “if a son became household head upon
his father’s head, he could not command authority over his brothers as had his father, since
all brothers were treated equally in the devolution of property. The other brothers were
intent on being masters of their own households” (WO: 81). This is confirmed by Moon’s
account according to which splitting members were typically the younger brothers of men
who succeeded to headship on their father’s death: “they broke away rather than submit to
their elder brother’s authority” (MO1: 171), and therefore parted with the stem household
in order to set up an independent farm unit on a portion of the family land.
Pre-mortem divisions
Pre-mortem divisions were also observed and they often stemmed from suspicions of free
riding. Tensions could arise because of the unequal sizes of the different conjugal units
forming the joint household. Thus, “a brother resented having to work twice as hard, or so
he believed, because one of his brothers had twice as many children” (WO: 81). But there
were many other pretexts or reasons nurturing jealous feelings among siblings. In particular,
“the relationships between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law inside households was fraught
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with tensions and jealousies” (MO1: 196).
Especially after the abolition of serfdom and other reforms, in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, improved outside opportunities in the form of expanding opportunities for wage labour
contributed to a surge in pre-mortem fissions and the growth in nuclear family households
(WO: 87, 115). Household divisions thus increased more rapidly in areas “where a substantial
portion of the population derived its income from non-agricultural pursuits” (WO: 105), a
phenomenon particularly noticeable in the central non-black earth region and elsewhere in
the forest heartland (MO1: 176). The tendency for households to split in such conditions
was accentuated by the fact that wage-earning members sometimes resented having to pay
towards the upkeep of their father’s households. If so, they tried to keep all or part of the
money for themselves, rather than hand it over to the head, which could lead to severe con-
flicts and determine them to demand partition “so that they could become the masters of
their own households” (MO1: 176, 196). This situation contrasts with that often observed
in the Pre-Emancipation period in which communal elders, “who were heads of their own
households, backed each other up in maintaining their authority over the younger genera-
tions”, which implies in particular that younger peasants were discouraged from breaking
away from their stem households (MO2: 385). Still, pre-mortem household fissions occurred
“in a substantial minority of cases” (Waldron, 1997: 71).
In this “substantial minority of cases”, the communal authority known as the Mir safe-
guarded its fiscal capacity by transferring part of the tax obligations weighing on the previous
family unit (which were proportionate to household size) to the new branch units. As is ev-
ident from a recent case study (Dennison, 2011: 103-110), the practice of tax assessment in
estate communes consisted of setting taxes according to the area of communal land (number
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of tiagly) possessed by a household, which itself was roughly in proportion of the number
of its male members between the ages of 17 and 65. In addition, each serf household was
required to provide some proportion of its grain harvest to the estate granary. The land-
lord of the estate studied by Tracy Dennison “explicitly stated that he was not interested
in knowing how feudal dues were distributed among serfs; he was concerned only that he
receive the total amount” (pp. 108-109). In other words, the collective fiscal responsibility
of pre-Emancipation rural communes did not prevent the member households from changing
their size and composition, and the distribution of taxes was adjusted accordingly (see also,
MO2: 383-85). After Emancipation, when the incentives for splitting abruptly increased,
the government tried in 1886 to limit household divisions by requiring the prior agreement
of the village commune. However, “the peasantry continued in the main to evade official
interference in household matters” (Waldron, 1997: 71).
Distribution of individual plots
Individualization of peasant households did not necessarily take the form of a split of the
original stem household. Individual plots of land could be awarded to male members who
continued to belong to the joint family. These members were expected to continue to help
their father and brothers in the cultivation of the household’s communal land allotments. The
sons were responsible for their share of the tax payments charged on the joint household’s
land and obliged to help support their parents when they retired. In return, they retained
rights to a share of the patrimony, minus whatever property was given them for individual
cultivation before the time of bequest. If, on the other hand, they stayed on the farmstead
but cultivated in a completely independent manner on a portion of the family’s land, they
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were disqualified for further inheritance (WO: 55).
Final remark At least as far as the pre-Emancipation period is concerned, the foregoing
account seems to run counter to the conventional view according to which peasants could
not take action because serfowners-landlords held complete power over peasant communities.
Following this view, it was the serfowner who largely decided on the allocation of land between
his demesne and the lands of the Mir (the peasant community), and peasants did not hold
individual property rights that would have allowed them to bequeath land to their children.
The fact that communal Mir lands were divided into strips farmed individually did not change
that picture at least until the Stolypin reforms of the early twentieth century.
Recent works such as those cited above have nevertheless cast doubt on the generalizability
of the conventional view of serfdom Russia. As argued by Dennison (2011), there was actually
a great measure of self-governance within the Mir, and even Hoch (1986) recognized that
serfowners had to cooperate with patriarchs to control this communal institution. Moreover,
the serfowner-landlord had to choose whether imposing a quit-rent or a corvee and, in the
latter case, he would also determine the size of the demesne. But it was always the peasants
who decided on land allocation inside the commune. More importantly for the sake of the
comparison that we have drawn between the situations in Tsarist Russia and West Africa,
while it was the serfowner who formally owned the land, in actual practice individual peasant
households held some important tenure rights over their portions of the communal land. In
particular, they could inherit them and, even more surprisingly, they could buy land under
the name of their landlord (Dennison, 2011).20
20We are grateful to Andrei Markevich who has clarified for us the points contained in this final remark.
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B Analytical framework
B.1 Optimization in the pure collective regime
In this section, we formally derive the Lagrangian multipliers for the maximization problem
in the strictly collective regime. The Lagrangian in this case is:
L = αf(A, nl)− β
(
1− α
n
fL(A, nl)− v′(l)
)
− γ
(
u− 1− α
n
f(A, nl) + v
)
(11)
The FOC are (we ignore the arguments of the various functions):
∂L
∂α
= f +
β
n
fL − γ
n
f = 0
∂L
∂l
= αnfL − β(1− α)fLL + βv′′ + γ(1− α)fL − γv′ = 0
If the participation constraint is unbinding, then γ = 0 and β = −nf
fL
. Using the second
equation, we can show that in that case, α is constant:
0 = αnfL − β(1− α)fLL + βv′′
⇔ 0 = αnfL + n(1− α)ffLL
fL
− nfv
′′
fL
⇔ 0 = αn+ n(1− α)ffLL
f 2L
− nfv
′′
f 2L
With f(a, l) = al1− and v(l) = ωl2, we have ffLL
f2L
= − 
1− and
fv′′
f2L
= 1−α
1− .
21 Substituting
21To obtain the first equality note that with f(a, l) = al1−, we have: fL = (1 − epsilon)al− and
fLL = (1 − epsilon)al−−1. Therefore ffLLf2L = −
a2l−2(1−)
(1−)2a2l−2 = − 1− . To establish the second equality
we use the incentive condition: fL = n1−αv
′ = n1−α2ωl and f =
l
1−fL =
2ωl2n
(1−α)(1−) which imply:
fv′′
f2L
=
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these expressions in the above equality yields:
0 = αn− n(1− α) 
1−  − n
1− α
1− 
⇔ α = 1 + 
2
If the participation constraint is binding, then the first inequality implies: γ = n + β fL
f
.
The second equality can thus be rewritten:
αnfL − β(1− α)fLL + βv′′ + (1− α)fLn+ β f
2
L
f
(1− α)− nv′ − β fLv
′
f
= 0
Replacing v′ with 1−α
n
fL and solving for β, we obtain:
β =
fL(n− 1 + α)
(1− α)fLL − v′′ − f
2
L
f
(1− α)(1− 1
n
)
Finally:
γ = n− 1
v′′f
f2L(n−1+α)
+ (1−α)(−fLL)f
f2L(n−1+α)
+
(1−α)(1− 1
n
)
n−1−α
B.2 Optimization in the mixed regime, for a given AI
In this section we formally derive the Lagrangian multipliers to the problem described by
Equation (8). These multipliers have different expressions depending on whether the partic-
ipation constraint binds.
2ωn
(1−)(1−α)
2ωl2
4ω2l2 =
1−α
1−
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B.2.1 Unbinding participation constraint
We show below that if the participation constraint does not bind, then ∂V
∂AI
< 0. If the
participation constraint does not bind, ν = 0 and the FOC are:
∂L
∂α
= f(A− nAI , nlC)− λ
n
fL(A− nAI , nlC) = 0 (12)
∂L
∂lC
= αnfL(A− nAI , nlC)− λ
(
v′′(lC + lI)− (1− α)fLL(A− nAI , nlC)
)− µv′′(lC + lI) = 0(13)
∂L
∂lI
= −λv′′(lC + lI)− µ (v′′(lC + lI)− fLL (AI , lI)) = 0 (14)
In the following, we use the subscript C for the production function on the collective field
and I to designate the production function on individual plots. The first equation implies:
λ = nf
C
fCL
. Substituting λ in the last equation yields: µ =
−v′′ nfC
fC
L
v′′−fILL
. Since λ is unambiguously
positive while µ is unambiguously negative, ∂V
∂AI
= −αnfCA −λ1−αn fCLA+µ 1nfCLA is negative, so
that unless the participation constraint binds, it is always optimal for the father to decrease
the size of the individual plots, or to increase the size of the collective field.
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B.2.2 Binding participation constraint
The FOC of the maximization problem in this case are:
∂L
∂α
= f(A− nAI , nlC)− λ 1
n
fL(A− nAI , nlC)− ν 1
n
f(A− nAI , nlC) = 0 (15)
∂L
∂lC
= αnfL(A− nAI , nlC)− λ
(
v′′(lC + lI)− (1− α)fLL(A− nAI , nlC)
)− µv′′(lC + lI)(16)
−ν (−(1− α)fL(AC , nlC) + v′(lC + lI)) = 0 (17)
∂L
∂lI
= 0 (18)
= −λv′′(lC + lI)− µ (v′′(lC + lI)− fLL (AI , lI))− ν (−fL (AI , lI)+ v′(lC + lI)) = 0(19)
Equation (19) implies: µ = −λ v′′
v′′−fILL
, since −fL
(
AI , lI
)
+ v′(lC + lI) = 0. Equation (15)
implies:
ν = n− λf
C
L
fC
(20)
Replacing µ and λ in equation (16) by these expressions yields:
αnfCL − λ(v′′ − (1− α)fCLL) + λ
v′′2
v′′ − f ILL
− n(−(1− α)fCL + v′) + λ
fCL
fC
(−(1− α)fCL + v′) = 0
⇔ αnfCL + (n− 1)(1− α)fCL + λ
(
−v′′ + (1− α)fCLL +
v′′2
v′′ − f ILL
+
(fCL )
2
fC
(1− α)(−1 + 1
n
)
)
= 0
⇔ λ = − (n− 1− α)f
C
L
−v′′ + (1− α)fCLL + v′′2v′′−fILL +
(fCL )
2
fC
(1− α)(−1 + 1
n
)
⇔ λ = − (n− 1− α)f
C
L
(1− α)fCLL + v
′′fILL
v′′−fILL
+
(fCL )
2
fC
(1− α)(−1 + 1
n
)
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This implies λ > 0, µ < 0. We also know that ν > 0 (property of the Lagrangian multiplier
of an inequality). We derive the expression for ν (needed below) from equation (20):
ν = n+
(fCL )
2(n− 1 + α)
v′′fILLfC
v′′−fILL
+ (1− α)fCLLfC + (fCL )2(1− α)(−1 + 1n)
⇔ ν = n− 1
v′′(−fILL)
v′′−fILL
fC
(fCL )
2(n−1+α) +
(1−α)(−fCLL)fC
(fCL )
2(n−1+α) +
(1−α)(1− 1
n
)
n−1+α
B.3 Splitting: signing the incentive effects
B.3.1 Splitting under the pure collective regime
In this section, we show that ∂lC
∂n
< 0 and ∂α
∂n
< 0 so that both the labor incentive effect and
the compensation effect are negative. Consider first the case of an unbinding participation
constraint. We can apply the implicit function theorem to the first order condition on labor:
F (n, α) =
1− α
n
fL(A, nl)− v′(l) = 0 (21)
∂l
∂n
= −
∂F
∂n
∂F
∂l
= −−
1−α
n2
fL +
1−α
n
lfLL +
1−α
n
A
N
fLA
1−α
n
nfLL − v′′
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With a constant return to scale production function, we have nlfLL + nAN fLA = 0, thus:
∂l
∂n
=
1−α
n2
fL
1−α
n
nfLL − v′′
It is clear that ∂lC
∂n
is negative. Similarly:
∂α
∂n
= −
∂F
∂n
∂F
∂α
= −−
1−α
n2
fL +
1−α
n
lCfLL +
1−α
n
A
N
fLA
− 1
n
fL
= −1− α
n
Again, ∂lC
∂α
is clearly negative.
Consider now the case of a binding participation constraint. We apply the Cramer’s rule
to the system of equations from which the optimal values for lC and α are implicitly obtained:
 F1 =
1−α
n
fL(
nA
N
, nlC)− v′(lC) = 0
F2 =
1−α
n
f
(
nA
N
, nlC
)
− v(lC)− u = 0
(22)
We have:
∂lC
∂n
= −
det
 ∂F1∂α ∂F1∂n
∂F2
∂α
∂F2
∂n

det
 ∂F1∂α ∂F1∂lC
∂F2
∂α
∂F2
∂lC

Assuming that f is homogeneous of degree 1 (or that we have constant returns to scale)
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greatly simplifies the expressions for ∂F1
∂n
and ∂F2
∂n
. It implies that f is homogeneous of
degree 1 and fL of degree 0, so that by virtue of Euler’s theorem: f = nAN fA + nlfL and
nA
N
fLA + nlfLL = 0. Thus:
∂F1
∂n
= −1− α
n2
fL +
1− α
n
A
N
fLA + l
1− α
n
fLL
=
1− α
n2
(−fL + AfLA + nlfLL)
=
1− α
n2
(−fL + 0) = −1− α
n2
fL
∂F2
∂n
= −1− α
n2
f +
1− α
n
A
N
fA + l
1− α
n
fL
=
1− α
n2
(−f + AfA + nlfL)
=
1− α
n2
(−f + f) = 0
Finally:
∂lC
∂n
= − −
1−α
n2
fL
f
n
−fL
n
((1− α)fL − v′) + fn((1− α)fLL − v′′)
This expression is unambiguously negative (recall that v′ = 1−α
n
fL so that (1−α)fL−v′ >
0).
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Similarly we obtain:
∂α
∂n
= −
det
 ∂F1∂n ∂F1∂lC
∂F2
∂n
∂F2
∂lC

det
 ∂F1∂α ∂F1∂lC
∂F2
∂α
∂F2
∂lC

= − −
fL
n2
(fL(1− α)− v′)
−fL
n
((1− α)fL − v′) + fn((1− α)fLL − v′′)
Both the numerator and the denominator are negative so that this expression is unam-
biguously negative.
B.3.2 Splitting under the mixed regime
In this section, we show that ∂lC
∂n
and ∂α
∂n
from equation (10) are both negative so that both
the labor incentive effect and the compensation effect are negative. For a given AI , α, lC and
lI are the (implicit) solution to the following system:

E1 =
1−α
n
fL((
A
N
− AI)n, lC + L)− v′(lC + lI) = 0
E2 = fL(A
I , lI)− v′(lC + lI) = 0
E3 =
1−α
n
f
(
(A
N
− AI)n, nlC
)
+ f
(
AI , lI
)− v(lC + lI)− u = 0
(23)
Like in the case of the pure collective regime, we can use the system of equations that
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implicitly define α, lC and lI in order to find expressions for ∂α
∂n
and ∂lC
∂n
:
∂α
∂n
= −
det

∂E1
∂n
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂n
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂n
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

det

∂E1
∂α
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂α
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂α
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

= −NUM1
DEN
NUM1 =
1
n2
(−fCL (1− α))(−fCL (1− α) + v′)(f ILL − v′′)
DEN =
1
n
(
(1− α)((fCL )2 − fCfCLL)f ILL + v′′(−(1− α)(fCL )2 + fC((1− α)fCLL + f ILL)
)
+
1
n
(
fCL v
′(−f ILL + v′′)
)
To obtain this expression, we used again the fact that f is homogeneous of degree 1 and
fL homogeneously of degree 0. Both the numerator and denominator are unambiguously
negative, so that ∂α
∂n
< 0.
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∂C
∂n
= −
det

∂E1
∂α
∂E1
∂n
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂α
∂E2
∂n
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂α
∂E3
∂n
∂E3
∂lI

det

∂E1
∂α
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂α
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂α
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

= −NUM2
DEN
NUM2 =
1
n3
(
fCfCL (1− α)(f ILL − v′′)
)
NUM2 is unambiguously negative so that ∂lC
∂n
< 0.
It is evident that ∂R
∂n
has an ambiguous sign.
C Analytical results
C.1 Proof of lemma 1
C.1.1 The case of the strictly collective regime
We start with the impact of A on α. First we show that α is monotonically decreasing in −A
(or: ∂α
∂A
> 0). This implies that α tends to its minimal value when A tends to zero. Then we
show that for all α > 0, there exists a land endowment such that the head would choose α.
This implies that the limit of α when A tends to 0 cannot be strictly positive: it has to be 0.
As A decreases or u increases, the participation constraint becomes tighter and eventually
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binds. When the participation constraint binds, α and l are the solution to the following
system:  G1 = 0 =
1−α
n
fL(
nA
N
, nl)− v′(l)
G2 = 0 =
1−α
n
f
(
nA
N
, nl
)
− v(l)− u
(24)
To find the sign of ∂α
∂A
, we apply Cramer’s rule:
∂α
∂A
= −
det
 ∂G1∂l ∂G1∂A
∂G2
∂l
∂G2
∂A

det
 ∂G1∂l ∂G1∂α
∂G2
∂l
∂G2
∂α

= − n
N
(1−α)2
n
fLLfA − nN 1−αn fAv′′ − 1−αn fLA ((1− α)fL − v′)
− 1
n
f ((1− α)fLL − v′′) + 1nfL ((1− α)fL − v′)
This expression is unambiguously positive. Assuming f(a, l) = ala− and v(l) = ωl2, we can
replace the first equation in the system with l = A
ε
1+ε
(1−α) 11+ε (1−ε) 11+ε
n(2ω)
1
1+ε
For all α > 0, we can then find A such that the system is satisfied. Indeed, the second
equation can be written:
u = (
n
N
A)
2ε
1+ε
1− α
n
(
(1− α) 11+ε (1− ε) 11+ε
(2ω)
1
1+ε
)1−ε
− ω
(
(1− α) 11+ε (1− ε) 11+ε
(2ω)
1
1+ε
)2 ,
which yields:
A =
N
n
u
1+ε
2ε
1− α
n
(
(1− α) 11+ε (1− ε) 11+ε
(2ω)
1
1+ε
)1−ε
− ω
(
(1− α) 11+ε (1− ε) 11+ε
(2ω)
1
1+ε
)2− 1+ε2ε
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Let us now turn to the impact of u on α. To prove the Lemma, we just need to show
that ∂α
∂u
< 0, and then the argument developed above applies: For each α > 0 there exists a
u such that the head would choose α, so that α tends to zero when u tends to +∞.
∂α
∂u
= −
det
 ∂G1∂l ∂G1∂u
∂G2
∂l
∂G2
∂u

det
 ∂G1∂l ∂G1∂α
∂G2
∂l
∂G2
∂α

= − − ((1− α)fLL − v
′′)
− 1
n
f ((1− α)fLL − v′′) + 1nfL ((1− α)fL − v′)
This last expression is unambiguously negative.
C.1.2 The case of the mixed regime
To prove the lemma, we use the same arguments as in the pure collective case. We show first
that ∂α
∂u
< 0 and ∂α
∂A
> 0. We assume the same functional forms as previously. For all given
values of AI , lC , lI and α are the solution to the following system:

E1 =
1−α
n
fL((
A
N
− AI)n, nlC)− v′(lC + lI) = 0
E2 = fL(A
I , lI)− v′(lC + lI) = 0
E3 =
1−α
n
f
(
(A
N
− AI)n, nlC
)
+ f
(
AI , lI
)− v(lC + lI) = u
(25)
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∂α
∂A
= −
det

∂E1
∂A
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂A
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂A
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

det

∂E1
∂α
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂α
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂α
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

= − NUM4
DENOM
NUM4 =
1− α
N
fCLA
(−(f ILL − v′′)((1− α)fCL − v′))− ((1− α)fCLL − v′′)(−1− αN fA(f ILL − v′′)
)
− v′′v′′
(
1− α
N
fA
)
=
1− α
N
fCLA
(−(f ILL − v′′)((1− α)fCL − v′))− ((1− α)fCLL)(−1− αN fA(f ILL − v′′)
)
− v′′
(
1− α
N
fAf
I
LL
)
Since 1−α
n
fCL = v
′, we have (1 − α)fCL > v′ and NUM4 is unambiguously positive, so that
∂α
∂A
> 0. When A tends to zero, α asymptotically tends to its lower limit.
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∂α
∂u
= −
det

∂E1
∂u
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂u
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂u
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

det

∂E1
∂α
∂E1
∂lC
∂E1
∂lI
∂E2
∂α
∂E2
∂lC
∂E2
∂lI
∂E3
∂α
∂E3
∂lC
∂E3
∂lI

= − NUM3
DENOM
NUM3 = −fCLLf ILL(1− α) + ((1− α)fCLL + f ILL)v′′
Clearly, NUM3 is negative and we showed in section B.3.2 that DENOM is also negative
(see section B.3.2). Therefore: ∂α
∂u
< 0.
The next step is to argue that α’s lower limit (when u tends to +∞ or A tends to zero)
cannot be strictly positive. Indeed, for all α > 0, we can find u such that the system defining
lC , lI and α holds. To see it, notice that from the difference E2−E1 we can extract lI(lC , α).22
Then E1 defines lC(α).23 As a result, we can write lI(α) and lC(α) and plug these expressions
in E3. Finally, E3 defines u(α): for all α > 0 there is a u such that α is a solution to the
system. Combined with the fact that ∂α
∂u
< 0, this implies that the limit of α when u tends
to +∞ can only be 0 (since ∂α
∂u
< 0 implies that α tends asymptotically to its limit and the
lower limit cannot be strictly larger than 0). This holds true for all possible values of AI ,
22lI(lC , α) = nlC( 1−αn )
− 1ε AI
A−nAI
23lC =
(
(1−α)(A−nAI)εn−ε−1
2ω(1+n( 1−αn )
− 1
ε A
I
A−nAI )
) 1
1+ε
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and, in particular, for the optimal AI .
We prove in a similar manner that the limit of α when A tends to +∞ can only be zero.
Holding AI constant, for any α > 0, we can find A such that α solves the above system of
equations. To see this, we begin by noting that the first equation implies:
((
A
N
− AI
)
n
)
= 2ω(lC + lI)(nlC)
n
1− α (26)
If we plug this expression for
((
A
N
− AI
)
n
)
into E3, we obtain an equation that neither
depends on α nor on A:
2ωnlC(lC + lI) + (AI)(lI)1− − ω(lC + lI)2 = u (27)
We can now replace lC in this equation by lC(lI) defined by E224, so that we obtain an equa-
tion that implicitly defines lI , independently of A. Thus lC can also be defined independently
of A, and equation (26) implies that, for all α > 0 and AI , there exists a value of A such
that α solves the above system of equations. This holds true a fortiori when AI is allowed to
vary.
C.2 Proof of lemma 2
If the head prefers the mixed regime, we know that the participation constraint is binding
for the optimal AI in that regime (Appendix B.2.1). To show that αmix > αcol, we argue
that αmix ≤ αcol is impossible.
24lC =
(
AI
lI
)
1
2ω − lI
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If αmix ≤ αcol then the participation constraint is not binding in the mixed regime since
dependents utility is strictly greater in the mixed regime than in the collective regime (where
it is greater or equal to u). To see it, consider the out-of-equilibrium situation where de-
pendents would apply the same effort in the mixed regime than in the collective regime and
would apply it to the same extent on the collective field and on their private plots. In that
case, overall farm production is the same in both regimes but the part retained by the de-
pendents is greater in the mixed regime (so that their utility is larger): per unit of land
under collective production they get at least the same income as before while they are full
claimants on the area under individual production and can thus extract more income from
it. We know that this is not an equilibrium situation and that by reallocating effort so as to
equalize their marginal income from the collective and their individual plot, they can further
increase their utility. It is thus clear that if αmix ≤ αcol, the participation constraint is not
binding in the mixed regime, which would never be chosen.
C.3 Proof of proposition 1
C.3.1 Land scarcity
We first compute the impact of an increase in A on the head’s rent under each regime to
compare the expressions obtained. In the mixed regime, for a given AI :
∂R
∂A
=
∂L
∂A
= α
n
N
fCA + λ
1− α
n
n
N
fCLA + ν
1− α
n
n
N
fCA
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Since ν = n− λfCL
fC
(Section B.2.2), we can write:
∂R
∂A
=
n
N
αfCA + λ
1− α
N
fCLA + (n− λ
fCL
fC
)
1− α
N
fCA
Or:
∂R
∂A
=
n
N
fCA + λ
1− α
N
fCLA (1− τLA)
where τLA = fAfLffLA is the substitution elasticity of production factors. Because τLA = 1 in the
case of the Cobb-Douglas function, the above expression reduces to:
∂R
∂A
=
n
N
fCA
A unit increase in the total family endowment increases the area of the farm by n
N
and
the impact on the head’s rent is equal to n
N
times the marginal productivity of land on the
collective field.
The same holds in the collective regime. If the participation constraint is unbinding, then
γ = 0 and β = −nf
fL
(section B.1)) and:
∂R
∂A
=
∂L
∂A
= α
n
N
fA − β 1− α
N
fLA
=
n
N
fA − 1− α
N
fLA
nf
fL
=
n
N
fA
To obtain the last simplification in the above expression, we use again the fact that fA = fLAffL .
If the participation constraint is binding we know γ = n+ β fL
f
(section B.1) and :
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∂R
∂A
=
∂L
∂A
= α
n
N
fA − β 1− α
N
fLA + γ
1− α
N
fA
=
n
N
fA +
1− α
N
β
(
fLA − fLfA
f
)
=
n
N
fA
In both regimes, as expected, the head’s rent is monotonically increasing in A.
Consider a given farm area A and a given family size n. If total effort is smaller in the
mixed regime lC + lI ≤ l, then:
nl
>
nlC
+
nlI
(28)
nl
>
nlC
AC
AC
+
lI
AI
nAI
(29)
The incentive compatibility constraint in the mixed regime (1−α
n
fCL = f
I
L) implies
lI
AI
=
nlC
AC
(
n
1−α
) 1
 , thus lI
AI
> nl
C
AC
, or lI
AI
= nl
C
AC
+ k, with k > 0. Thus inequality (29) becomes:
nl
>
nlC
AC
(
AC
+
nAI
)
+ k
nAI
nl
>
nlC
AC
+ k
nAI
fA > f
C
A
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If total effort is greater in the mixed regime, that is if lC + lI > l:
v′(lC + lI) > v′(l) (30)
⇔ 1− α
mix
n
fCL
mix
>
1− αcol
n
f colL (31)
If αmix > αcol, then 1− αmix < 1− αcol and inequality 31 implies:
fCL
mix
> f colL
⇔ (1− )
(
AC
nlc
)mix
> (1− )
(
nl
)col
⇒
(
AC
nlc
)mix
>
(
nl
)col
⇔
(
nlc
AC
)mix
<
(
nl
)col
⇒ fCAmix < f colA
If αmix ≤ αcol, we have shown above (see section C.2) that the participation constraint is
not binding in the mixed regime, so that this is not a relevant case to examine. Finally, we
have established that wherever the mixed regime is relevant (in the sense that there exists AI
such that the participation constraint is binding in the mixed regime and it is not trivially
inferior to the collective regime), the head’s rent is monotonically increasing in both regimes
and it increases faster in the collective regime than in the mixed.
Suppose that the head is indifferent between the mixed and the collective regime. As
shown above, a marginal decrease in A decreases his rent to a greater extent in the collective
than in the mixed regime when AI is maintained constant, so that the mixed regime is strictly
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preferred. This holds true a fortiori when the head can change AI . If we consider a marginal
increase in A, the head’s rent increases more in the collective than in the mixed regime when
AI is maintained constant. If AI is allowed to vary, could the head’s rent increase to a greater
extent in the mixed regime? The answer is negative because a marginal increase in A has a
greater impact on the head’s rent in the collective than in the mixed regime for all relevant
AI .25
Let Amin be the level of land endowment such that the head’s rent is null in the collective
regime. As A goes from Amin to +∞, either the collective regime dominates everywhere, or
there exists a level of land endowment such that the head is just indifferent between the
mixed and the collective regimes. Then, for A < , the head prefers the mixed regime, while
for A > , the head prefers the collective regime.26
C.3.2 Change in reservation utility
We first show that, if u tends to 0, the collective regime dominates the mixed regime. We
then examine the influence of u on the head’s propensity to give out individual fields when
he is just indifferent between both regimes.
When u tends to zero, the participation constraint becomes unbinding in the mixed regime
25To see this, consider a marginal increase in A from A1 to A2. Call AI∗(A) the optimal size of individual
plot when total land endowment is A, Rcol(A) the head’s rent in the collective regime and Rmix(A,AI∗(A)),
his rent in the mixed regime. We know: Rmix(A2, AI∗(A2)) − Rmix(A1, AI∗(A2)) < Rcol(A2, ) − Rcol(A1).
In addition, by definition, it is true that: Rmix(A2, AI∗(A2)) − Rmix(A1, AI∗(A1)) < Rmix(A2, AI∗(A2)) −
Rmix(A1, A
I∗(A2)). It follows that: Rmix(A2, AI∗(A2))−Rmix(A1, AI∗(A1)) < Rcol(A2, )−Rcol(A1). Even
when the father adjusts AI in the mixed regime, therefore, his rent does not increase as much as in the
collective regime.
26It is indeed not possible that in the range Amin and , there exist a land endowment a where the mixed
regime is irrelevant in the sense that the participation constraint would be unbinding and the collective is
chosen. This would imply that at a, the participation constraint is unbinding in the mixed regime, while at
it is binding. This is impossible since a decrease in A tightens the participation constraint.
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for all AI . To prove this result, let us show that, if the incentive constraints are satisfied,
the participation constraint is automatically satisfied for values of u very close to zero. With
the Cobb-Douglas production function and the polynomial cost of effort (v(l) = ωl2), the
incentive constraints are:
1−α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)ε(nlC)−ε = 2ω(lC + lI), and (1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)−ε = 2ω(lC + lI).
Adding the two expressions, we get:
1− α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)ε(nlC)−ε + (1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)−ε = 4ω(lC + lI)
⇔ (lC + lI)
(
1− α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)ε(nlC)−ε + (1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)−ε
)
= 4ω(lC + lI)2
⇔ 1− α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)εn−ε(lC)1−ε + (1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)1−ε
+lI
1− α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)ε(nlC)−ε + lC(1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)−ε = 2ω(lC + lI)2 + lC2ω(lC + lI)
+lI2ω(lC + lI)
Since the incentive constraints on the individual and collective fields imply: 1−α
n
(1− ε)(A−
nAI)ε(nlC)−ε = (1 − ε)(AI)ε(lI)−ε = 2ω(lC + lI), the last two terms on both sides of the
previous equality cancel out and we obtain:
1− α
n
(1− ε)(A− nAI)εn−ε(lC)1−ε + (1− ε)(AI)ε(lI)1−ε = 2ω(lC + lI)2
⇒ 1− α
n
(A− nAI)εn1−ε(lC)1−ε + (AI)ε(lI)1−ε − ω(lC + lI)2 > 0
The LHS is the level of utility achieved by a member. Since it is strictly greater than zero, we
conclude that, for values of u very close to zero, the participation constraint is automatically
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satisfied. The mixed regime never dominates if the participation constraint is unbinding for
all AI , since the father’s rent is then monotonically decreasing in AI (see section B.2.1). As
a result, when u tends to zero, the head of a collective farm never finds it optimal to grant
individual plots.
Furthermore, when u tends to zero, the member’s participation constraint is unbinding
in the collective regime. To show it, we use a similar argument than in the case of the mixed
regime. The incentive constraint is: 1−α
n
(1−ε)(A)ε(nl)−ε = 2ωl. This expression is equivalent
to 1−ε
n
1−α
n
(A)ε(nl)1−ε = 2ωl2, which implies: 1−ε
n
1−α
n
f > ωl2 and finally 1−α
n
f − v(l) > 0.
Thus, for values of u very close to zero, the participation constraint is automatically satisfied.
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of a marginal change in u on the head’s rent
in both regimes. The envelop theorem implies that a marginal increase in u decreases the
father’s rent by γ in the pure collective regime and by ν in the mixed regime (since we know
that the optimal AI in the mixed regime is such that the participation constraint binds, cf
footnote 3.3.), where the Lagrangian multipliers have a parallel expression:
γ = n− 1
v′′fs
(fsL)
2(n−1+αs) +
(1−αs)(−fsLL)fs
(fsL)
2(n−1+αs) +
(1−αs)(1− 1
n
)
n−1+αs
(32)
ν = n− 1( −fILL
v′′−fILL
)
v′′(fC)n
((fCL )
n)2(n−1+αm) +
(1−αm)(−(fCLL)m)(fC)m
((fCL )
m)2(n−1+αm) +
(1−αm)(1− 1
n
)
n−1+αm
(33)
With a Cobb-Douglas production function (f(A, l) = Aεl1−ε) and a polynomial cost of effort
(v(l) − ωl2), we have: −ffLL
f2L
= ε
1−ε and
fv′′
f2L
= 1−α
1−ε . Using these relationships, the above
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expressions become:
γ = n− 1
(1−αs)
(1−ε)(n−1+αs) +
(1−αs)ε
(1−ε)(n−1+αs) +
(1−αs)(1− 1
n
)
n−1+αs
ν = n− 1( −fILL
v′′−fILL
)
(1−αm)
(1−ε)(n−1+αm) +
(1−αm)ε
(1−ε)(n−1+αm) +
(1−αm)(1− 1
n
)
n−1+αm
When the head is just indifferent between the pure collective and the mixed regimes,
we know that αm > αs (Appendix C.2) so that, γ > ν. At a point of indifference, a
marginal increase in the reservation utility therefore has a greater (negative) impact in the
pure collective regime than in the mixed regime. The head would thus strictly prefer the
mixed regime. Conversely, a marginal decrease in the reservation utility induces the head to
strictly prefer the collective regime.
Finally, as u goes from 0 to +∞, either the collective regime dominates everywhere, or
an indifference level of utility exists, and the mixed regime dominates for utility levels higher
than that threshold level, while the collective regime dominates for smaller levels.
C.4 Proof of proposition 2
To analyze how a marginal change in u or in A changes the incentive to split the family, we
examine the conditions under which ∂R
∂n
> 0.
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C.4.1 Land endowment, reservation utility, and the decision to split in the pure
collective regime
We know that, as u tends to zero, the participation constraint becomes unbinding (sec-
tion C.4).To obtain an expression for ∂R
∂n
when the participation constraint does not bind,
we replace ∂α
∂n
and ∂l
∂n
in equation 10 by the expression obtained in section B.3.1, and we use
β = −nf
fL
. We then find:
∂R
∂n
= α(
A
N
fA + lfL) + β
1− α
n2
fL − β 1− α
n
(
A
N
fLA + lfLL
)
=
α
n
f + β
1− α
n2
fL
=
2α− 1
n
f
We know that, when the participation constraint is not binding, α = 1+
2
(section B.1).
Finally:
∂R
∂n
=

n
We can thus conclude that ∂R
∂n
is unambiguously positive, meaning that it is never desirable
for the head to let one son leave the farm with some land. By implication, when u tends to
zero, the head will never choose to split the family.
Conversely when u tends to +∞, the participation constraint is binding and we can show
that the family head will choose to split the family. Again, to obtain an expression for ∂R
∂n
we
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replace ∂α
∂n
and ∂l
∂n
in equation 10 by the expression obtained in section B.3.1. We find that:
∂R
∂n
= α(
A
N
fA + lfL)−
fαfL
1−α
n2
fL + f
fL
n2
(fL(1− α)− v′)
fL
n
((1− α)fL − v′)− fn((1− α)fLL − v′′)
=
α
n
f − ff
2
L
1−α
n2
(α + 1− 1
n
)
fL
n
((1− α)fL − v′)− fn((1− α)fLL − v′′)
from which we infer that:
∂R
∂n
> 0
⇔ α
n
>
f 2L
1−α
n2
(α + 1− 1
n
)
fL
n
((1− α)fL − 1−αn fL)− fn((1− α)fLL − v′′)
>
1
n
(α + 1− 1
n
)
(1− 1
n
)− ffLL
f2L
+ fv
′′
f2L(1−α)
We again use −ffLL
f2L
= ε
1−ε and
fv′′
f2L
= 1−α
1−ε . This considerably simplifies the previous expression
since we now obtain the following condition:
∂R
∂n
> 0
⇔ α > α + 1−
1
n
2
1−ε − 1n
⇔ α > 1−
1
n
1+ε
1−ε − 1n
This condition is increasingly difficult to satisfy as n increases (for all n: ∂ψ
∂n
> 0, with
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ψ =
1− 1
n
1+ε
1−ε− 1n
), which is intuitive. Once the family is really large, it becomes less interesting
for the head to keep it whole.
Furthermore, when u gets very large, then α tends to 0 (proof in section C.1) and we
have:
∂R
∂n
< 0
⇔ 0 > 1−
1
n
1+ε
1−ε − 1
This last inequality holds for all n > 1, and suggests that the family head will always split
the family if u is infinitely large
We have just shown that the head of a collective farm chooses to split the family when u
tends to +∞ while he prefers to keep the family whole when u tends to 0. Since the father’s
rent is monotonically decreasing in u, there must exist a unique level of u so that the head
is just indifferent between splitting and not.
Let us now show that when land is very abundant, the participation constraint does not
bind. We argue that for any given reservation utility u, we can find a land endowment
large enough to make the dependent’s utility exceed u. The incentive constraint implies
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l =
(
(1−α)(1−)
2ωn
) 1
1+
n
1−
1+A

1+ . Using this expression, we can write a dependent’s utility as:
u =
1− α
n
A(nl)1− − ωl2
=
1− α
n
An1−
(
(1− α)(1− )
2ωn
) 1−
1+
n
(1−)2
1+ A
(1−)
1+ − ω
(
(1− α)(1− )
2ωn
) 2
1+
n
2(1−)
1+ A
2
1+
= n
2(1−)
1+ A
2
1+
(
1− α
n
) 2
1+
((
1− 
2ω
) 1−
1+
− ω
(
1− 
2ω
) 2
1+
)
We know that, if the participation constraint is not binding, α = 1+
2
(section B.1). We thus
have to ask whether, for large enough A, u ≥ u with α = 1+
2
. The above equation implies
that this is the case for A such that:
A > u
(
1− 
2n
)− 1

n−
1−

((
1− 
2ω
) 1−
1+
− ω
(
1− 
2ω
) 2
1+
)− 1+
2
In particular, when A tends to +∞, this condition will be satisfied for all u so that the par-
ticipation constraint is unbinding. We have shown above that, if the participation constraint
does not bind, it is never optimal to split the family. Therefore, when A tends to +∞, the
head will not split the family.
Conversely, when land is very scarce, the participation constraint binds and we have
shown that:
∂R
∂n
> 0⇔ α > 1−
1
n
1+ε
1−ε − 1n
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When A gets very small, then α tends to 0 (proof in section ??) and we have:
∂R
∂n
< 0⇔ 0 > 1−
1
n
1+ε
1−ε − 1
This last inequality holds for all n > 1, which suggests that the family head will always split
the family if A is close to zero.
Since the father’s rent is monotonically increasing in A, there exists a level of A such that
he is just indifferent between splitting the family and keeping it whole.
C.4.2 Land endowment, reservation utility, and the decision to split the family
in the mixed regime
We know that, if A tends to +∞ or u tends to zero, the collective regime always dominates
the mixed regime. We therefore focus on the head’s propensity to split in the mixed regime
when A tends to zero or u tends to +∞.
Let us derive an expression for ∂R
∂n
in the case where the participation constraint binds
(which is the case when A tends to 0 or u tends to +∞). Replacing ∂α
∂n
and ∂l
∂n
in equation (10)
by the expressions obtained in section B.3.2, we have:
∂R
∂n
=
α
n
fC
+
fCfCL (1− α)(fCL − v′)(f ILL − v′′)
n ((1− α)((fCL )2 − fCfCLL)f ILL + v′′(−(1− α)(fCL )2 + fC((1− α)fCLL + f ILL) + fCL v′(−f ILL + v′′))
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Thus:
∂R
∂n
> 0
⇔ α > f
C
L (1− α)(fCL − v′)(f ILL − v′′)
(1− α)((fCL )2 − fCfCLL)f ILL + v′′(−(1− α)(fCL )2 + fC((1− α)fCLL + f ILL) + fCL v′(−f ILL + v′′)
With the Cobb-Douglas production function and the polynomial cost of effort, we again have:
−ffLL
f2L
= ε
1−ε and
fv′′
f2L
= 1−α
1−ε . As a result:
∂R
∂n
< 0
⇔ α < f
C
L (1− α)(fCL − v′)(f ILL − v′′)
f ILL(f
C
L )
2 1−α
1−ε − v′′(fCL )2 1−α1−ε + v′′fCf ILL + (fCL )2 1−αn (−f ILL + v′′)
<
(fCL )
2(1− α)(1− 1−α
n
)(f ILL − v′′)
(fCL )
2 1−α
1−ε (−f ILL + v′′)
(− 1
1−ε +
1
n
)
+ v′′fCf ILL
<
1− 1−α
n
1
1−ε
(
1
1−ε − 1n
)
+
v′′fCfILL
(fCL )
2(1−α)(fILL−v′′)
<
1− 1−α
n
1
1−ε
(
1
1−ε − 1n
)
+ 1
(1−α)(fC
L
)2
fCv′′ −
(1−α)(fC
L
)2
fI
LL
fC
<
1− 1−α
n
1
1−ε
(
1
1−ε − 1n
)
+ 1
(1−ε)− fI
fC
n2
1−α (fIL)2
fI
LL
fI
<
1− 1−α
n
1
1−ε
(
1
1−ε − 1n
)
+ 1
(1−ε)+ fI
fC
n2
1−α
1−ε
ε
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When A tends to 0 or u tends to +∞, α tends to 0 (proof in section C.1.2) and we have:
∂R
∂n
< 0⇔ 0 < 1−
1
n
1
1−ε
(
1
1−ε − 1n
)
+ 1
(1−ε)+ fI
fC
n2 1−ε
ε
This last inequality holds for all n > 1. We may therefore conclude that, when land is very
scarce or the reservation utility is very large, the father will choose to split the family under
the mixed regime.
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